1 2 3	George Cajiga, Fresno County Public Defend 2220 Tulare Street, Suite 300 Fresno, California 93721	(Arrn. already set Apr. 27, 2004) Department 53, 8:30				
	Telephone: (559) 488–3546	Est. time 30 min.				
4	Facsimile: (559) 262–4104	Def. in custody.				
5	Peter M. Jones / State Bar # 105811/ PD # 00	71 N Z D Z007				
7	Garrick Byers / State Bar # 104268 / PD # 0010					
	E-mail pjones@fresno.ca.gov; gbyers@fresno.ca.gov Attorneys for Marcus Wesson <sup>1</sup> FRESNO COUNTY SUPERIOR COU					
8		DEPUTY				
9	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA					
10	IN AND FOR THE CO CENTRAL					
11	CLIVITAL	D1 (10101)				
12						
13	The People of the State of California,	Case No.: F049017856				
14	Plaintiff,	Defendant Wesson's				
	vs.					
15	Marcus Wesson, Motion to Compel Discovery on					
16	Defendant	His Second Discovery Request				
17						
18						
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1	V. The Specific Discovery Requests in This Motion to Compel 5	
2	1. The gunshot residue test results of Mr. Wesson himself, of the deceased persons, and of anybody else who was tested	
	2 and 3. Statements by Wesson and by witnesses at the scene	
4	4. The autopsy and coroner's reports	
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14	I. Introduction.	
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16	To: The Hon. Judge of this Court, and to the Fresno County District Attorney.	
17	This motion is brought by authority of Penal Code section 1054.5, subdivision (b).	
18	Defendant, Marcus Wesson, requests this court to hear this forthwith.	
19	Wesson's second discovery request was for the eleven items listed on pages 10 to	
20	14 of "Defendant Wesson's Motion for Expedited Pre–Prelim Discovery," filed on April	
21	6, 2003.	
22	Wesson's first request for discovery was less particularized, but more	
23	comprehensive. At arraignment on the complaint, March 25, 2004, Wesson made, in	
24	open court and on the record, a blanket request for informal discovery. The court ordered	
25	reciprocal discovery. Arraignment Transcript, March 25, 2004, page 10, lines 13 to 16.	
26		

comprehensive discovery request more then a month ago, and made his second, less-comprehensive request 22 days ago.

Wesson makes this request now, at arraignment, for three reasons.

First, Wesson cannot fully prepare for trial until the prosecution provides more discovery, particularly the discovery that is the subject of this motion to compel. He wishes to expedite his trial by expediting his receipt of the required discovery.

Second, Wesson needs the Discovery he was requesting before the preliminary examination to determine if the lack of that discovery deprived him of a substantial right, such as the right to cross–examination.<sup>2</sup> He desires to quickly resolve this matter, one way or the other, rather then to prolong it.

Third, Wesson needs the search warrant discovery to determine if he should make a motion to suppress the evidence involved, as having been unlawfully seized. Again, Wesson wishes to quickly resolve this matter, rather then to prolong it.

The prosecution, on April 12, 2004, claimed that its failure to provide discovery is because "All discovery that is currently available has been provided to the defense. It's all the discovery I've got."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See, e.g., *Stanton v. Superior Court* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 265 (failure to provide favorable evidence before preliminary examination may deprive the defendant of a substantial right.)

The prosecution also claimed that it did not have to provide discovery because the defendant had not, at that time, brought a motion to compel. Preliminary Examination Transcript page 346, lines 12 to 14. But no motion to compel is required for the prosecution to be bound by the disclosure requirements of Penal Code section 1054.1. If a motion to compel were required, that would defeat the informal purposes of The Discovery Chapter, because then nobody would make any disclosures until the adverse party brought a formal motion to compel. *People v. Jackson* (19093) 15 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1201 – 1203. This also underscores that motions to compel under Penal Code

That reason must fail. It will be perfectly obvious, when Wesson's discovery requests are analyzed below, that the most, or all, of the requested material is in the possession of the Fresno Police Department, the Fresno County Coroner, or the other investigating agencies.

Material that is in the possession of the investigating agencies is constructively in the possession of the prosecution. If they have it, the prosecution has it. To rule otherwise would be to let the pace of discovery be determined not by the prosecution, as the statute requires, but at the pleasure of the subordinate agencies. The California Supreme Court does not tolerate that. *In re Brown* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 880 – 881.

Wesson is requesting the court to order immediate disclosure of the following items, which he requested in his "Motion for Expedited Pre-Prelim Discovery."

1. "The gunshot residue test results of Mr. Wesson himself, of the deceased persons, and of anybody else who was tested." This was item 1 in Wesson's "Motion for Expedited ... Discovery."

Wesson has now received discovery that before March 19, 2004, material was taken from Wesson himself, and from the bodies of Sebhrena Wesson and a second deceased person, possibly Elizabeth Breani Kina Wesson, for the purpose of testing for gunshot residue. (He does not know if material was taken from anybody else.) The results of these tests make a great deal of difference to both sides, since they would have a strong tendency to show who fired the nine fatal shots in this case. Surely those tests

section 1054.5 are quite appropriate where, as here, the defendant has a compelling need to obtain required discovery sooner then 30 days before trial.

Mr. Wesson has now received discovery stating that numerous audio- and some
video- tapes were made of Wesson's and of witnesses' statements, as well as dispatch
and radio tapes, but he has not received any of them.

- 8. The report from the Police Legal Advisor reporting the call from the scene.
  This was item 8 requested in Wesson's "Motion for Expedited ... Discovery." Mr.
  Wesson has not received this.
- 9. The search warrant and affidavits in support. This was item 9 requested in Wesson's "Motion for Expedited ... Discovery."

Mr. Wesson has not received these. The court has, at the request of the Fresno Police Department, sealed some or all of this material, in separate cases W04912037–9, W04912038–7, W04912029–5, and W04912450–4.<sup>5</sup> The Fresno Bee has filed a motion protesting this, and a separate hearing has been set.

But even if the material remains sealed, still, it must be provided to Mr. Wesson.

First, the search warrant is discoverable under Penal Code section 1054.1. For example, surely, the warrants, and their supporting affidavits contain "[r]elevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witensses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial ...." The prosecutor must, therefore, also disclose them to the defense, by command of Penal Code section 1054.1, subdivision (f).

For another example, the affidavit supporting the search warrant, and some of the evidence seized may also contain "Statements of [the] defendant[]." The prosecution

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The sealing orders have also been filed in this case, on March 30, 2004, and April 16, 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Even if "only" the police, not the prosecution itself "has" the warrants in their immediate actual possession, still, the discussion above shows, they are in the constructive possession of the prosecution itself.

must therefore disclose those to the defense, this time by command of Penal Code section 1054.1, subdivision (b).

As a third example of why the search warrant material is discoverable, the returns of the warrants probably contain "... relevant real evidence seized ... as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged...." Again, therefore, the prosecution must disclose that evidence to the defense, now by command of Penal Code section 1054.1, subd. (c).

If the prosecution fails to disclose all of this material to the defense, then the court must apply the remedies and sanctions of Penal Code section 1054.7. Surely the remedy would have to be exclusion of the evidence, both the real evidence and the prosecution's witness's statements. Indeed, a proper remedy could extend beyond mere exclusion.

In addition to his right to discovery under Penal Code section 1054.1, Wesson has a right, under Penal Code section 1538.5, to file a motion to suppress any illegally obtained evidence. Obviously, he cannot do that unless he obtains the warrants, their supporting affidavits, and all related material. And for Wesson to do this in an orderly manner, he must have this material well in advance of trial.

But if the prosecution claims an official privilege to refuse to provide this material, and the court sustains that, then Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a) will apply.

Evidence Code section 1042, subd. (a), provides as follows (boldface added).

"Except where disclosure is forbidden by an act of the Congress of the United States, if a claim of privilege under this article ... is sustained in a criminal proceeding, the presiding officer shall make such order or finding of fact adverse to the public entity bringing the proceeding as is required by law upon any issue in the proceeding to which the privileged information is material."

The Law Revision Comment to Evidence Code section 1042, points out that if relates to the legality of a search, the remedy can include striking witness—testimony.

That Comment also states that if the material goes to guilt or innocence, the remedy can also include dismissal of the case.

This is an application of the U.S. Supreme Court's teaching in *U.S. v. Reynolds* (1953) 345 U.S. 1, 12:

"... [S]ince the Government which prosecutes an accused also has a duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense."

Wesson recognizes that the prosecution may be permitted to "defer[]" disclosure if immediate disclosure would result in "possible compromise of <u>other</u> investigations by law enforcement." Penal Code section 1054.7, paragraph 1, emphasis added.

But Section 1054.7 does not provide the court any authority to defer disclosure if the only reason is that the investigation in *this* case is ongoing. But this investigation is the only reason given for sealing that is stated in the sealing–orders.<sup>7</sup>

But even if there is some "other" ongoing investigation, again, if the prosecutor is allowed to withhold the search warrant material from the defense, the remedies and sanctions of Penal Code section 1054.7 and Evidence Code section 1042 will apply, to, surely, exclude the material from this trial entirely.

Accordingly, even though the search warrant material is sealed, the court must compel the prosecution to provide him, immediately, all of that material.

10. <u>Photographs and diagrams of the scene.</u> This was item 10 requested in Wesson's "Motion for Expedited ... Discovery."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Each sealing order is nearly identical. See each order, page 1, lines 10 to 14.

1	Since then, Wesson has received several diagrams of the scene. He does not know			
2	if he has received them all. The discovery included reports that hundreds of photographs			
3	have been taken. Yet he has not received any of them at all.			
4				
5	11. All evidence favorable to Mr. Wesson on the issue of guilt or punishment.			
6	This was item 11 requested in Wesson's "Motion for Expedited Discovery." The			
7	prosecution has not stated whether or not it has such evidence.			
8				
9				
10	Conclusion.			
11				
12	The court should set this motion for a formal hearing as soon as possible.			
13	After the hearing, the defense will request the court to require the prosecutor to			
14	provide all of the discovery listed above, immediately.			
15				
16	Respectfully Submitted,			
17				
18	4/26/04			
19	Date			
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23	Peter M. Jones Garrick Byers			
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	Wesson's Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint			
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## AFFIDAVIT OF PROOF OF SERVICE (2009, 2015.5 C.C.P.)

State of California )

County of Fresno )						
Comes now the undersigned, who hereby declares as follows:						
I am a citizen of the	I am a citizen of the United States of America and am employed in the county					
aforesaid. I am over the ag	aforesaid. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within					
above-entitled action; my business address is Public Defender's Office, County of						
Fresno, 2220 Tulare Street, Suite 300, Fresno, California 93721.						
On the 26th day of April , 2004, I served a copy of the attached						
[TITLE OF MOTION] on an employee of the office of the District Attorney, for the						
County of Fresno, by delive	County of Fresno, by delivering and depositing a true copy thereof with said employee.					
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that						
the foregoing is true and correct.						
Dated: <u>April 26</u> , 2004.						
Iffner & Kuckubaker						
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT IS ACKNOWLEDGED.	RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT IS ACKNOWLEDGED.	RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT IS ACKNOWLEDGED.				
DATE:	DATE:	DATE:				
BY:	BY:	BY:				